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We believe in many different ways. One very common one is by supporting ideas we like.
We label them correct and we act to dismiss doubts about them. We take sides about
ideas and theories as if that was the right thing to do. And yet, from a rational point
of view, this type of support and belief is not justifiable. The best we can hope when
describing the real world, as far as we know today, is to have probabilistic knowledge.
In practice, estimating a real probability can be too hard to achieve but that just means
we have more uncertainty, not less. There are ideas we defend that define, in our minds,
our own identity. And recent experiments have been showing that we stop being able
to analyze competently those propositions we hold so dearly. In this paper, I gather the
evidence we have about taking sides and present the obvious but unseen conclusion that
these facts combined mean that we should actually never believe in anything about the
real world, except in a probabilistic way. We must actually never take sides since taking
sides compromise our abilities to seek for the most correct description of the world. That
means we need to start reformulating the way we debate ideas, from our teaching to our
political debates. Here, I will show the logical and experimental basis of this conclusion. I
will also show, by presenting new models for the evolution of opinions, that our desire to
have something to believe is probably behind the emergence of extremism in debates.
And we will see how this problem can even have an impact in the reliability of whole
scientific fields. The crisis around p-values is discussed and much better understood
under the light of this paper results. Finally, I will debate possible consequences and
ideas on how to deal with this problem.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We believe. We believe in the honesty of certain people and in the dishonesty of others. We might
believe we are loved. Some of us believe in deities, some believe in political or economical ideas,
some believe in scientific results. We have beliefs on how the world ought to be and, sometimes,
at least for those beliefs, we are aware that reality does not correspond to them. But we also hold
beliefs about the actual state of the world, about how things actually are. And sometimes those
beliefs are so strong that we feel justified in saying that we know. We often choose to say we know
the truth and we defend those beliefs as if they were indeed true. We can also hold beliefs about
abstract entities that do not actually exist in the world outside our minds and languages, such as
numbers. We make claims of knowledge, and we expect to have real knowledge. This expectation
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is so strong that in logic, it is often considered that the phrase
“Someone knows p” means that p is actually true [1]. The beliefs
we defend have a vast importance in all social aspects of human
life. We have several organizations based on the spread of ideas,
on defending the beliefs that the people in those organizations
hold to be true, as if they were superior to beliefs of others. We
join groups that share our beliefs and we fight (sometimes only
verbally) those we disagree with. We even often define ourselves
based on what we believe, as, for example, by our religious or
political beliefs. But, as we will see, taking sides is not only
logically wrong. It also makes us dumber than we could be, as
experiments have been showing lately.
The actual question of what beliefs and knowledge are is an
old and, maybe surprisingly, still open problem in Philosophy [2].
The concept of belief seems so natural that we have never really
doubted its usefulness; so far, we only tried to understand and
define it properly. But, when we have asked what knowing and
believingmean, we have usually been forced to ask if knowledge is
even possible. And one common logical answer is that Skepticism
[3] could be unavoidable. And yet, whenever we have taken a
position that did not include the hardest forms of Skepticism,
the concept that we would accept some ideas and reject others
have always come naturally.We do not question it. Accepting and
rejecting ideas about the real world, seems natural, as a concept,
it has survived for a long time without being properly challenged.
It could be the case we have never challenged it just because it is
too obviously right. But it is a scientist duty to ask if this is indeed
the case. And we must acknowledge that the concept might just
feel obvious as consequence of some very deep instincts we have.
Indeed, recent experiments in cognitive psychology point to
serious problems with the way we naturally work with our beliefs
and how we update them. Our many flaws in reasoning have
led to the conclusion that the main function of our reasoning
might not be making better decisions. Our reasoning about
ideological issues does seem to come in packages better described
as irrationally consistent [4]. Instead of looking for truth and
correctness, we seem to use reasoning to win arguments [5, 6] and
to protect our own cultural identity [7]. Looking for the correct or
best answer might even be irrelevant in too many cases. At best,
finding better answers could be just a beneficial side effect of the
actual purpose of our reasoning skills. Their main function seems
to be a social one, to allow us to identify and defend the ideas of
those groups that define the way we see ourselves.
These results pose interesting questions. Since we do not use
our reasoning to find the truth under many circumstances, a
natural question we should ask but usually avoid is how we
could counter this insidious bias. But even this question might
not address the problem fully. A more meaningful and complete
question could actually challenge the very idea that we should
have identity-defining beliefs. That is the point of view I will
defend in this paper. Evidence shows clearly that when we
embrace an idea, be it a religion or a political ideology, we start
wishing to defend that idea. And our brains start working to
defend this interest, instead of looking for the correct answers.
While it is not clear if this could pose a problem for moral issues,
where no correct answer is known to exist, we do have a problem
when confronted with any ideology that makes claims on how
the world actually is. Here, I will show why we should make very
strong efforts to avoid those types of beliefs. In Section 2, I will
present the problem as we know it now. I will review some of the
evidence that shows our many reasoning errors and biases and
proceed to investigate, from a normative point of view, if there
is any reason to hold and defend beliefs. I will also briefly show
that real life might demand us to speak as if we were defending or
attacking an idea but that this does not necessarily mean holding
beliefs about it.
In Section 3, I use a computational model to highlight the
potential damage the desire to have a belief can cause, even if, at
first, the agents are in doubt. I will investigate, by using the tools
of opinion dynamics [8–13], how the way we treat beliefs can
have a profoundly deep impact on the extremism of our thoughts.
And how a subtle change in the way we think about problems
can have an absurdly strong effect on extremism. I will investigate
the effects of two possible causes: the differences that arise from
communication methods where uncertainties are expressed, and
the differences on how strong opinions can become based on how
our own internal expectations about the information we obtain.
The simulations presented will make a very strong case in favor
of why we must change the way we deal with beliefs, not only
to become better when looking for true or best answers (as if
was not already reason enough) but also to avoid extremism.
The simulations will show that extremism can be a result of the
expectation to find a definitive single answer instead of being
satisfied with a mixed result.
In Section 4, I will address the consequences of all those
conclusions for scientific practice in general. As we will see,
avoiding taking sides can help correct some problems we still
have with the reliability of the scientific enterprise. The question
of whether or not scientific knowledge can be considered far
more reliable than any other kind of knowledge is one that
many people consider settled. And yet many of those people who
think they know the answer strongly disagree with each other.
They take sides and defend those sides. Individual points of view
vary widely. Some people consider that all scientific knowledge
is no more valid than any other type of opinion, as in some
wild interpretations that followed the proposals in the strong
program in the sociology of knowledge [14]. Others hold very
strong realistic beliefs that we are actually uncovering the true
laws of Universe. Or even bolder positions that allow Stephen
Hawking to claim,maybe as a joke, that he believes Roger Penrose
to be a Platonist [15]. While it would make no sense to deny that
actual scientists are human beings and, therefore, subjects to our
failures and social pressure, it also makes no sense to deny the
incredible achievements Science has achieved or attribute them
to sheer luck. It makes sense to be quite wary of these identity-
defining ideas so strongly defended by their proponents. It might
indeed be wiser to learn which aspects of the best description
of the problem each of the sides got right. In the terminology
of Section 3, we should strive here to be mixers instead of
wishers.
That we have sent probes to the outer reaches of the Solar
System, that we have eliminated diseases and dangers and we
live much longer than we used to just a couple of centuries ago
are clear indications that we must be doing something right.
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On the other hand, since we should not take sides, there is
some reason to be concerned about scientific work (or any work
that requires intellect). Indeed, instead of a cold and strictly
rational relationship with the word of ideas, scientists can be
quite passionate about what their defend. We now have access
to data that points to the fact that stronger intellects might
actually show stronger polarization of opinion effects [16]. More
intelligent people can use their intelligence to protect the things
they believe; the larger the brain power, the better defense one
can prepare. At one side, we have our achievements to tell we are
doing something right, at the other side, evidence that tells us to
doubt the conclusions of our most intelligent individuals.
A deductive analysis of what Science can prove does not get
us more confident. Popper idea of false-ability [17] was indeed
based on the trivial logical fact that when a theory makes a
prediction, just observing that the prediction holds provides no
proof at all that the theory is right. On the other hand, if the
prediction fails, we do know that, since the conclusions were
wrong, something must be wrong with the premises. For Popper,
that meant that, after proper checks for other possibilities, the
theory had to be false. But that is actually only true if too many
conditions are met. First, there must be absolutely no chance for
experimental error. But the theory we can reject then is only the
whole set of ideas used to make the prediction. That includes
every detail about the Universe assumed during calculations.
If one uses a more traditional meaning to the word theory,
Popper idea that a theory can be proved false is just wrong
from a strict deductive point of view [18, 19]. The discovery of
Neptune is the classical example of a prediction (the movement
of Uranus) that was wrong not because the theory of newtonian
gravity was failing. Uranus did not behave the way the theory
predicted because there was another unknown planet we did
not know at the time, Neptune. Neptune gravitational influence
could not have been considered in the calculations before its
existence was known. The structure of the Solar System is not
considered part of Newtonianmechanics or any theory of gravity,
it is just an auxiliary hypothesis. That is, actual failure of any
predictions can be due to the theory we are testing being wrong,
of course. But the failure can also be caused by many other
hypothesis we had to make to obtain the predictions. From a
strictly deductive point of view, we can not hope to prove any
theories neither right nor wrong. The existence of Neptune was
verifiable and, therefore, it might seem at first that we could
actually have disproved newtonian mechanics if Neptune did
not exist [20]. But other hypothesis could have been made. Real
calculations involve approximations and we never really have
an exact prediction from a theory. There will always be the
possibility that a new, unthought hypothesis could save any given
theory.
The real problem is, of course, as we will see in Section
2, the fact that deduction can not actually tells us anything
about the real world. This is true for scientific reasoning, just
as it is true for any other kind of reasoning. Instead, we need
inductive tools to estimate which theory is more likely to describe
the world correctly. Indeed, current descriptions of scientific
work have proposed that scientist, when doing honest work,
would behave as if they were Bayesian agents, an idea known as
Confirmation Theory [21–23]. While this is a solid prescription
for how scientists should behave, there is actually little evidence
that scientists reason better than any other intelligent person.
While a Bayesian description does capture the qualitative aspects
of our reasoning nicely [24, 25], we know we actually fail
at most probability estimates [26–28]. Indeed, since the first
experiments on how we humans change already probabilistic
opinions when presented new data, it has been observed that
we have a strong tendency to keep our old opinions, a bias
known as conservatism [29]. It is therefore reasonable to expect
that we will have problems in Science. These problems might be
minimized by some of the characteristics of the scientific work, by
social effects, or not at all. If they are minimized, understanding
which characteristics are important for that minimization could,
in principle, help us improve the way we reason as scientists, as
citizens, and in our general lives. If, or when, it is not, we must
learn to improve and correct the ways we, scientists, work.
We already know that previous observations of scientific work
have suggested that scientists break some expected norms all the
time. Surprisingly, we will see that part of this non-compliance
with the investigated norms is in complete accordance to
normative Bayesian reasoning. It might actually be one reason
why some areas are quite successful in explaining their objects of
study. While those observations, when they were first made, were
considered evidence that we should adopt a vision where all ideas
are equally valid, this proposed (and quite damaging) relativism is
not justified at all. The concept that we should accept the creation
of new ideas, regardless of how much they contradict what we
currently know is actually a good prescription. But Induction
dictates that all these ideas must be ranked in a probabilistic way
and that means they will not be equal at all. Some ideas will be
far more probable than others. There are theories that we can
claim, in a harmless abuse of language, that we have proved to be
wrong. Ideally, we have to remember that we should keep even
those theories as very remote possibilities. It might be justified
to discard them in cases where our limitations dictate we can
not consider all possibilities and must focus only on the more
probable ideas, of course. But no idea can actually be discarded
by data and they should survive in a limbo of basically useless
concepts. And that means, among other things, that we actually
need pure theorists in every mature area and those theorists
should be capable of providing testable predictions.
Finally, not taking sides has another very important
consequence on how we should analyze data. We have created
and we have promoted the widespread use of statistical tools that
have the objective of discarding hypotheses. Far worse, we have
made those tools central to the whole process of acceptance of
ideas in some areas of knowledge. This human desire to know the
absolute truth and avoid dealing with the undesired uncertainty
of the probabilities is at the very core of the whole problem caused
by the widespread use of p-values and tests of hypothesis. Those
tests are making whole fields of knowledge far less trustworthy
than we can tolerate. We actually cause too much harm by using
techniques aimed at excluding ideas, instead of ranking them.
And we must change as fast as possible what is considered proper
statistical techniques as they make our desire to defend an idea a
much stronger problem.
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2. WHY WE SHOULD NOT HOLD ANY
BELIEFS AT ALL
2.1. Individual and Group Reasoning
That we humans fail at reasoning far more often than we would
like to believe is now a well established result. The so called
paradoxes of choice of Allais [30] and Ellsberg [31] have shown
that our decision making is not rational, in the sense that it can
not be described by a simple maximization of any utility function.
We actually behave as if any probability value told to us were
subject to the application of a weighting function before we use
the value to make any decisions [32, 33]. Among other things,
that means we overestimate the probability of unlike events.
We see correlations in data when there is none simply because
they seem to make sense [34] and fail to see them when they
are surprising [35]. We interpret probabilistic information too
badly, even in professional settings. To the point that we already
have efforts to improve the understanding of basic probabilistic
concepts among health professionals [36].
Since the first experiments with probabilistic choices,
scientists have also explored other aspects of our reasoning with
results that can be considered even more disturbing. We actually
fail at very trivial logical problems [37, 38] and we provide
different answers to the same question simply because it was
framed differently [39]. We are not even aware of how badly we
reason, we overestimate our chances to get correct answers [40],
with the possible exception of the cases when we are actually
really good at those specific questions, when underestimation
of successes can happen [41]. These two effects combined can
generate a dangerous combination of overconfidence among the
incompetent and under-confidence among competent people
and the consequences of this could be potentially disastrous.
A curse of incompetence seems to plague us in some areas,
and this can be particularly hard to notice for the cases where
the competence needed to perform a task and the competence
needed to know if we are competent are exactly the same ones
[42]. And there is more. Sometimes, when presented with new
information about a problem, we can become more certain of
our answers even when we are making actual worse evaluations
[43]. When reasoning in groups, we, at least, have mixed, good
and bad, results. Our combined reasoning can indeed be more
solid under some circumstances, a phenomenon known as the
wisdom of the crowds [44]. But interaction and social pressures
inside groups can actually make groups reason far more poorly
than individuals [45, 46]. Social pressure can make us fail even in
absurdly easy tasks almost nobody would get wrong, as shown,
already in 1955, by the Ash experiments [47, 48].
The combination of all these experiments paints a grim
scenario about our reasoning skills. When compared to all our
accomplishments as a species, it should be clear that a part
of the answer is missing. Of course, there is another side to
this story. In particular, there are fundamental issues associated
with the fact that information processing is a costly effort. More
brain power requires more energy consumption. That means that
theoretically optimal decision rules might not be ideal in the real
world, where a compromise between effort and correctness might
be the actual ideal [49]. So, if there are situations when we can
get a reasonably good answer most of the time with less effort,
by using some simplified rule of thumb, that informational cheap
answer might be the optimal solution in the evolutive problem,
even if it is not the most accurate answer to the problem. By
spending less energy thinking, it might have been in our best
interest to not explore the problem further when a reasonable
answer is available [50]. Indeed, there are quite simple heuristics
that have been shown to be very effective [51, 52] at giving good,
reliable answers. Our brains might just be looking for workable
approximations, not the correct ones. Indeed, our reasoning
seems to be clearly not well adjusted to logical problems at all,
not without some amount of real previous training. But, while
we are naturally incompetent at solving novel logical problems,
when formally identical problems using situations we are familiar
with are presented, we are actually quite good at solving them
[53]. Even our probabilistic biases can actually be understood as
reasoning that is similar to a Bayesian inference problem [25]
where we correct the probability values we hear assuming they
might be just an estimate [24]. It is in new problems, those far
from our daily life, that we seem to fail even in the simplest
questions. The worrisome thing to notice here is that all scientific
advance happens in exactly new problems.
More recently, a very interesting answer to why we actually
reason and, therefore, whywe seem to have somany biases and do
so many mistakes, have started to become clear. While reasoning
can actually be used for looking for correct answers, this might
not be its primary function. The ability to look for correct answers
might even be just a luck accidental consequence of our actual
need and use for reasoning. The more we learn, the more it
seems we use reasoning mostly as a tool for winning arguments
[5, 6]. And winning an argument does not necessarily means
being correct. It just means we want to convince the listeners
or be convinced by them. When there is already agreement,
there would be no need for further exploration of the problem.
That explains the very well-known confirmation bias [54] where
people tend to look solely for information that confirms what
they already think. Interestingly, this tendency to use reason
mainly as a social tool to convince others is a result that appears
to be universal, and not dependent on specific cultures [55]. That
is, the real function of our reasoning abilities would be the social
one. Our quest for truth, the function we would like to believe,
might have nothing to do with our reasoning. Of course, winning
arguments is not something we all can do. Someone will lose and,
for the cohesion of the social group, the group should adopt the
winning argument. It is about convincing or be convinced.
Sadly, our reasoning flaws are not restricted to everyday
problems. We already have evidence that the public perception
of scientists opinions can be quite wrong in several issues,
such as global warming [56] or the disposal of nuclear waste
[57]. Kahan et al have observed that even the way we perceive
whether there is a scientific consensus on a specific question is
influenced by which behaviors we find socially acceptable and
which behaviors we believe are socially detrimental [7]. We know
we value consistency in our beliefs to the point that the set of
beliefs we adhere to can be more easily described as irrationally
consistent [4]. We accept independent ideas as a package, put
together for one sole purpose, that they support a conclusion we
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wish to be true. We call these packages ideologies and we take
sides and defend them. We often define who we are based on the
ideologies we prefer. But, by doing so, we condemn ourselves,
even the brightest ones among ourselves, to irrationality and
stupidity. Indeed, there is now good evidence that our reasoning
works in an identity-protective way [58]. Given the amount
of already existent evidence on how our sides influence our
reasoning, Kahan has proposed that information should always
be presented in ways that are compatible with the values and
positions of the listener, in order to allow the new information
to be absorbed with less prejudice [59]. The cleverer we are, the
better we can create arguments to defend our identities and the
harder it may be to learn we are actually wrong! That suggests
once more that, when facing problems that are associated with
the ways we define ourselves, the function of our reasoning is
not to find correct answers. Instead, its real function is to protect
that identity, to protect our group and our side of the discussion.
That includes, as we have discussed, forming arguments that
support our views. Indeed, tests of how scientific literacy as well
as numeracy correlate with beliefs about climate change among
member of the public showed that those who scored higher on
literacy and numeracy presented the strongest cases of cultural
polarization [16]. Those increased skills actually allow people
to defend their chosen positions better, instead of making them
better at analyzing the literature and the evidence. The conclusion
we can arrive from those observations is a scary one. Brilliant
individuals who take sides might not be trustworthy about their
opinions at all. Their arguments are probably worth listening
to and analyzing. But their final conclusions must be seen as
irrelevant, at least when they show certainty.
2.2. Normative Reasoning
Certainty (or the desire for certainty) is indeed a central part of
the problem.We should want our reasoning to help us to arrive at
the right answers, we assume that is what reasoning does, instead
of simply being a tool to advance the goals of our own specific
social group. That seems fundamental. But, as commitment to
one idea seems to make all of us reason poorly, it makes sense to
ask if we should not just get rid of such commitments. Therefore,
we must now ask if, from a normative, logical point of view, such
commitments even make sense. We are so used to choosing ideas
and defending them that we do not even question if we should
keep doing it. We do not ask if there are better alternatives, we
have never questioned if the concept of taking sides might not be
just plainly wrong. But that is exactly what we need to do.
Defending an idea would make sense if we knew it to be the
truth. So, the first thing to consider is if, when we claim to believe
in something, we are actually saying we have concluded that
something is true. There is, of course, a weaker meaning to the
word believe, as when we say “I believe it will rain tomorrow.”
In this case, we are not really claiming knowledge, we are just
making a statement that can be loosely described as probabilistic,
despite the fact that no probability was mentioned. There is clear
uncertainty in the phrase. As such, this is not the meaning we are
interested about, since our social group will not suffer and our
identity will not be threatened at all if it turns out we were wrong.
We usually do not really take sides on those questions and we
easily accept those beliefs can be wrong. It is when believing is
used as if it meant knowing that we can be in trouble. Therefore,
that is the meaning we must investigate.
The problem of what knowing means is actually a very old
philosophical question. Despite several attempts at defining the
meaning of knowing, no clear answer has ever been reached.
Apparently reasonable answers, such as the concept of justified
true belief, are known to have flaws and exception cases that make
them not a real correct answer [60]. Deductive logic exists at least
since Aristotle, allowing us to make proofs where no doubt exist.
But only as long as we do not doubt the premises. Newer, more
complete, and better versions of deductive logic have appeared
but they all depend on what you accept initially as true. There is
always the need to already believe some initial concepts as true
in order to use the logical tools, just as we need postulates to
start any kind of mathematical thought. First truths seem to be
unreachable by any deductive logic, as far as we know today. We
can prove conclusions, we can not prove premises, not unless we
make more primitive premises.
The form of reasoning we have that allows us to accept
propositions about the real world is Induction. As far as we
know, it is as old as Deduction, but it has never led to certainties.
Indeed, it is based, among other things, on the assumption that
the patterns we have observed in the past will be repeated in the
future. And that assumption will not be true in every situation
[61, 62]. While it is reasonable to expect Gravity to keep working
as it has always done, there are actually areas of knowledge where
expecting the future to strongly resemble the past sounds as an
absurd, such as technology, the behavior of financial markets
where completely new products are always been created, or the
evolution of our own societies and economies as more and more
types of work can be replaced by machines. Induction can still be
useful in these cases, as we try to understand some underlying
laws that might be more basic than the superficial data. But
serious doubt will remain.
Indeed, from what we have learned so far about its uses,
inductive reasoning can be a powerful and very useful tool, but it
means that the desire for knowing the truth must be abandoned.
In its place, a probabilistic approach, where we only estimate the
likelihood that a given statement is true, is the best scenario we
can expect. How to estimate those probabilities and change them
as we learn more can be a very difficult or even an impossible task
in real problems, but, at least in theory, we have the prescription
for how it must be done. More than that, it is interesting to
notice that different assumptions on the same problem of how
induction should be performed lead to the same rule for changing
probabilities as we learn more about the world [63–65]. We just
need to apply a deceptively simple probability rule known as
the Bayes theorem. However, despite Bayes Theorem apparent
simplicity, using it in the context of real problems is almost never
easy. Far from it, we still are plagued with a large number of
unsolved problems, some of them related to the specification
of initial knowledge, others about the models about the world
that are required to use the theorem for an actual complete
description of the possible theories about the world.
One approach equivalent to the bayesian method was
proposed 50 years ago by Solomonoff [66]. This approach
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sheds some very interesting light on the full requirements of
the bayesian induction. For a full analysis of any problem,
probabilistic induction would require both infinite information
processing abilities to generate all possible explanations that are
compatible with the data we have, as well infinite memory to
deal with all those explanations and use them to calculate its
predictions. While those requirements do not make Bayesian
methods wrong nor useless, they do mean that even when
estimating probabilities, the best we can hope for is an
approximation to the actual probability values. Uncertainty
remains even about the “real” probability values. Better methods
to estimate uncertainty can always be created.
The state of the area and the technical difficulties of actually
using those methods are interesting problems, but beyond the
scope of this paper. What matters here is that, given our
current state of knowledge in deductive and inductive logics,
probabilistic beliefs about the world actually make normative
sense but certainties do not. While we sometimes use the word
belief in a probabilistic sense that fits very well with inductive
considerations (I believe I will get that job), there are also times
when we use the word belief as a weird claim of unjustified
certainty. When we say someone believes in some set of religious
claims or in an ideology, for example, we are often saying
that person thinks she actually knows those sets of claims are
actually true. Some people would agree that certainty is not really
warranted. Instead, the set of beliefs is their best guess, a guess
that person is willing to defend. But willingness to defend an idea
can be far stronger than just thinking the idea is very probable. It
is one thing to behave like that in moral issues. It is a completely
different problem to do the same on descriptions of the world.
The world is the way it is, regardless of what we think or feel
about it. To make strong statements about the world, when those
statements are simply not warranted should be considered a
serious form of irrationality. And a damaging one, due to the way
we reason.
2.3. Psychology Experiments and Logic
Combined
Let’s see what we have. Actively believing and defending an idea
brings a series of negative consequences to our ability to pursue
the truth. Experiments show that we tend to accept concepts
simply because they support the conclusions we wish were true.
At the same time, we submit the ideas that we disagree to an
actual rational analysis, looking for possible errors. We value the
ideas we believe in ways that resemble an endowment effect [67],
where we value an object more if it is our possession. While the
experiments conducted so far were focused mostly on political
views and popular opinions about scientific issues, their results
seem consistent enough.
The special case of moral beliefs could be treated apart. It
is theoretically possible that a person could know her moral
preferences. But we have a serious problem when we consider
beliefs about the real world. The choice of one idea over another
is never justified from a rational point of view, at least not to the
point of certainty. In situations of limited resources, choosing one
idea because we have no time to consider all other alternatives is
a perfectly rational choice. For example, choosing one treatment
for a patient is necessary, but that does not mean that we decide
all other possible illnesses must be wrong. We just decide the
best current course of action, based on the chances we estimate
for each disease and how serious their consequences might be.
That does mean that the correct thing to do is not taking sides
and defend one specific diagnosis, the decisions we make today
must be easy to change, as we learn more. Any physician who
would choose one initial diagnosis and then simply defend that
choice and never change it should be considered incompetent,
damaging and dealt with accordingly. Things are not different
for any other area of knowledge. Decisionmaking is fundamental
and unavoidable. But we do have the tools to deal with decision
problems involving uncertainty. On the other hand, there is
nothing wrong with making probabilistic statements. Claiming
one idea is far more probable than its alternative is logically
correct.
This analysis assumes the debate is happening between
knowledgeable, honest people. When debating people who
refuses to even learn about the evidence that already exists, taking
sides might be almost unavoidable. But that should not mean
defending one idea as true, even though things might look that
way. It can be just a very basic defense of the need for rational
thinking as opposed to the very unreliable human thinking. In
such cases, the decision process might even tell us the best thing
to do can be to take the side of competence and clear logical
thinking against cherry-picking tactics and circular reasoning. It
can also be true that the best tactics might be simply to ignore the
irrational debaters. Correct decision making includes estimating
the outcomes of each possible action, taking into consideration
the different probabilities for each idea. And that could mean the
best momentary decision is, at a certain point, to temporarily act
to defend or oppose one idea. As long as we do not believe in it as
a certainty, we are logically correct.
We should, of course, never forget that our brains are limited
machines. Some ideas are so improbable that we can claim them
wrong in any practical terms based on the evidence we have
collected so far (we will see an example in Section 4). In those
cases, it will often make sense to disregard concepts that we
have sufficiently strong evidence to discard as highly improbable.
But this is different from claiming our ideas to be correct. Or
even to claim certainty that the ideas we have discarded are
wrong; it is always possible that new evidence might force us
to change our opinions. We, scientists, claim to actually know
that and that ideas might return and that we always should be
open to changing our minds when faced with that new evidence.
However, experiments show that by belonging to any group
where an idea is defended we make ourselves vulnerable to our
human shortcomings. Observations of real scientists working
actually agree that we are not different from the picture that
emerges from the experiments. We are far too stubborn and we
cling to the ideas we defend despite evidence, as we will review in
Section 4.We are not different and, as any humans, we stop being
truth-chasers and become idea-defenders. That actually makes
our individual opinions unreliable when we take sides. Anyone
that is out there defending an idea should actually be considered
a non-reliable source of information. That just means that we
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should not believe what we say just because we say it, that the
arguments and data are the only real thing that matters.We know
that, but it is probably far more important than we might have
thought.
3. HOW THE WAYS WE HANDLE BELIEFS
AND HOW WE COMMUNICATE CAN
INFLUENCE EXTREMISM
Unfortunately, our desire to have one side to defend does not
only makes us unreliable. It can also be a fundamental factor in
the appearance and spread of extremist views. Extreme opinions
can be observed in many different issues and they are not
always a problem. While a very strong opinion is sometimes
warranted (for example, about not leaving the 20th floor by the
window), there are several other circumstances where the same
strength of opinion makes no sense. Even if we could ignore the
appalling influence of extremist opinions on terrorism and wars,
we would still be left with a series of problematic consequences
associated with too strong beliefs. As examples, we know that
some types of extreme opinions can cause serious problems in
the democratic debates between the opposing political parties
[68] or in how minorities are perceived [69]. One way that we
have used to understand how extremism evolves is using the
tools provided by opinion dynamics [8–13]. Opinion dynamics
studies how opinions, extreme or not, spread through a society
of artificial agents. As such, it can help us understand the factors
that contribute to the decision of holding strong beliefs. In issues
where there is actually no clear known answer, understanding
the dynamics of how ideas spread and become stronger might,
in principle, help us prevent problems and maybe even avoid the
loss of human lives.
Previous works in the area have studied different aspects of
the question, always based on one specific ad-hoc model chosen
by the authors of each paper. In purely discrete models, although
there is no strength of opinion, it is still possible to introduce
inflexible agents [70]. It is also possible to include a larger than
two number of opinions to better represent not only the choices,
but how strong they are [71, 72]. However, strength of opinion
is either not measured in those cases, or is limited to very few
possible values. It is worthwhile to have a continuous variable
that will represent the strength of the opinion to better define
who is an extremist. While discrete, Ising-like models [73] can
be very helpful to study how inflexible agents can influence
the opinion of the rest of the population, they leave questions
answered. Therefore, there is a large number of studies in the
area that use as basis the bounded confidence (BC) models and
their variations [12, 74]. One of the questions that have been
investigated with the use of BC models is how agents with
extreme opinions, represented by values that are close to the
limits of the possible opinion values, can influence the rest of the
society [75, 76]. These studies included studying the effects on the
spread of extremism from factors such as the type of the network
[77, 78], the uncertainty of each agent [79], the influence of
mass media [80], and the number of contacts between individuals
[81]. Consequences of extremism have also been studied in this
context, both negative, such as escalation in intergroup conflict
[82] as well as possible positive effects such as the possibility that
extremism might help maintain pluralism [83].
BC models have a central limitation. In most
implementations, an interaction either brings the agents to
an intermediary opinion or their opinions do not change at all.
That is, unless a mechanism for the strengthening of opinions
is added by hand, opinions just don’t get stronger than the
initially existing ones. Agents with already extreme opinions
have to be included in the initial conditions. On the other
hand, in the continuous opinions and discrete action (CODA)
model [13, 84], it is possible to start only with agents who have
moderate initial opinions and, due to the interactions and local
reinforcement, those agents can and usually do end up with very
strong views. This was accomplished by combining the notion
of choice from discrete models with a continuous subjective
probability each agent holds about the possibility that each given
choice might be the best one. By assigning a fixed probability
that each neighbor might have chosen the best possible choice, a
trivial application of the Bayes Theorem yields a simple additive
model where extremism arises naturally [85]. The general idea
of using Bayesian rules as basis for Opinion Dynamics has been
investigated and it was observed that the generated models are
actually a good description of the real observed behavior [86].
And, while there is indeed strong evidence that people do not
update their opinions as strongly as they should, a bias known
as conservatism bias [87], several of our biases can actually be
explained by more detailed Bayesian reasoning, if the possibility
of error in the information source is included [24].
By separating the internal opinion from what other neighbors
observe, CODAmodel allows a better description of the inference
process that underlies the formation of opinions. Indeed, the way
CODA was built can be used as a general framework to produce
different models [84]. These new models can be obtained simply
by changing the assumptions on how agents communicate, think
or use the information available to them. Traditional discrete
models can be obtained as a limit case of the situation where
an agent considers its own influence on the opinion of its
neighbors [88]. Here the separation between internal opinion
and communication is a central aspect that can be included
in many different models [89]. If the communication happens
not in terms of choices but in terms of a continuous average
estimate of a parameter, the BC model can also be obtained
as an approximation to a Bayesian rule model [90]. Extensions
of the CODA model were proposed to study the emergence of
inflexibles [91], the effects of several agents debating in groups
[92], as well as the effect that a lack of trust between the
agents can have on social agreement [93] and the effects of the
motivation of the agents [94]. Interestingly, for a completely
different application, unrelated to social problems, the same ideas
can even be used to obtain simple behaviors of purely physical
systems, with properties such as inertia and the harmonic
oscillator behavior arising from continuous time extension of
Bayesian opinion models [95]. Here I will use the fact that the
Bayesian framework behind CODA can be trivially applied to
describe how agents think and behave to study differences in
communication and mental models. This makes it possible to
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explore the circumstances where extremism is more likely to
appear and what makes opinions become too strong.
We know that extremism usually doe s not develop from the
interactions in BC models, while it is prevalent in the CODA
model. In BC models the agents observe a continuous value as
the opinion of the other agent. Therefore, a possible explanation
for the lack of increase in extremism could be associated with
this different form of the communication. In the BC case, we
only communicate continuous values, signaling doubt about the
discrete choices where only the supported option is shown.
Perhaps the reason why extremism is much stronger in CODA
might be because of the availability of doubts. In order to check
this possibility, a version of the CODA model where the actual
probability assigned to the two options is observed instead of the
preferred choice will be introduced.
On the other hand, a subtle but important difference between
CODA and BC models exist in the assumptions agents make. In
BCmodels, agents aim to find a continuous value. It is reasonable
to think they would be satisfied with an intermediary value and
most of them quite often do. In CODA, the question is changed
to which of two options is the best one. That means that there is a
strong underlying assumption that a best answer exists. However,
the ideal quest for finding the best answer might not be well
described this way. It is perfectly reasonable to assume, in many
cases, maybe in most cases, that the optimal choice is not one or
the other, but a mixture of both, with proper weights. Examples
are many. When choosing the best food among two options, the
optimal solution might be take 75% of the first one and 25% of
the second. In Politics, the optimal policy, when there are two
competing ideologies, could also be to use 50% of the ideas of
each one of them. And so on. From a normative point of view, a
mixture is also a more complete model. This happens because the
case where one of the two options is actually the best one is just
a special case, a possible answer, when the optimal solution goes
to 0% or 100%. Such compromise is not included in the CODA
model nor in the variation I just mentioned. But it is central in
BC models. In order to investigate this effect, a second variation
of CODA is proposed here, where the agents look for the correct
proportion, instead of the correct option.
3.1. The Models
While the first obvious difference between the BC and CODA
models is what agents observe from the other agents, the
assumptions about the mental model agents have of the world are
also subtly different. BC models assume the agents are looking
for a correct value inside a range, typically between 0 and 1.
In CODA, while the agents have a probabilistic estimate of the
correctness of a choice (therefore, also a number between 0 and
1), they hold the belief that only one of the options can be true. In
particular, by assigning a probability p to A being the best choice
and 1−p to the alternative choice B, one is ignoring the possibility
that the ideal answer could be an ideal proportion f around 0.5.
Instead, p only represents the chance that A is optimal. It makes
sense to investigate what happens if agents consider the optimal
could be obtained as a proportion f of A and a proportion 1 − f
of B. While this might sound similar to the way CODA works,
it is a complete different model. From a mathematical modeling
point of view, the difference could not be clearer. Instead of a
probability p assigned to one specific result, the case where all
mixtures are acceptable requires a continuous distribution g(f )
over the space of proportions f , where 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. That means
that a new terminology is needed. From now on, I will refer to
agents who look for a single isolated answer as certainty wishers
or, more simply, wishers. Those who accept that the best current
answer can be a mixture of both choices will be called mixers.
Of course, not only the mental model is important. If
communication is continuous (and honest, as we will assume
all the time here), wishers will provide the probability that A is
the best choice, while mixers would give us their best estimate
fi of how much of A should be included in the optimal answer.
But communication can also happens in a discrete way. In this
case, while using the same rule (if p or f are larger or smaller
than 0.5), wishers are picking the option they believe more likely
to be the best one, while mixers would be simply indicating
which option they expect would be present more strongly in
the optimal answer. To explore the difference in communication
and mental expectations, we must therefore investigate how
extremism emerges in all combinations, represented by the four
cases bellow:
Certainty wishers Mixers
Discrete observation CODA New model 2
Continuous observation New model 1 Bounded
Confidence (BC)
Notice that every model in this table will involve continuous
variables. It is what is observed (observation) and what is
expected (choice) that can be either discrete or continuous. The
literature already shows very clearly the effects of CODA and BC
models on extremism. In CODA, extremism appears from local
interactions even when only moderate opinions existed at first. In
BC models, the same is not true. With no extremists in the initial
conditions, no extreme opinions emerge; the general tendency in
the population is that agents become more moderate in time. In
order to obtain a complete picture, we must learn how extremism
evolves in the two new cases. To make the comparison natural,
a generative framework for different models is necessary. As we
have seen, extensions of the CODA model did generate such a
framework [84] and the ideas in the framework have been used
to obtain a version of the BC models that agree qualitatively with
its results [90]. Therefore, we can simply refer to the known BC
results from the literature as if they had been generated by the
same framework and investigate here the consequences of the two
new variations.
That framework can be summarized as the following recipe.
First, represent the subject as a variable x that agents want to
estimate. Here, x will have different meanings, since for wishers it
will be the probability p that A is the best option while for mixers
x will be the proportion that one should include A in the final
answer. Each agent i has a subjective opinion about x, represented
by a probability distribution fi(x) over all possible values of x.
Communication happens as agent imanifests its opinion, usually
not as the distribution fi, but as a functional Ci[f ] of f (for
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example, the expected value of x given by f ). Of course, Ci[f ]
can be a discrete or continuous variable or even a vector, if the
communication involves several different pieces of information.
In CODA, Cj is obtained by the option that is most likely to be
true, that is Cj[p] = +1, if p > 0.5 (representing the observation
that j prefers A) or Cj[p] = −1 when p < 0.5. In the new
models, wishers will simply state their probabilities, Cj[p] = p,
while mixers, when using discrete communication, will use a rule
similar to CODA. The only difference is that instead ofCj[p], they
will apply the condition to the expected value of the frequency,
that is, the functional will be defined by Cj[E[f ]]. Finally, as agent
j observes the opinion of i from Ci[f ], it needs a likelihood for the
value it observes. That is, for every possible value of x, we need
a model that states how likely it would be to observe Ci[f ], that
is, p(Cj|x). With this, Bayes theorem tells us how agent j should
update its subjective opinion f (x) to a new distribution f (x|Cj).
Implementation of the models in this paper followed this
steps:
• All agents start with moderate opinions. That means their
observed or preferred choice can change with just one
observation of a disagreeing neighbor.
• At each iteration, one agent is randomly drawn as well as one
of its neighbors. The neighborhood is obtained from a 2-d
lattice with periodic boundary conditions, except in the cases
where a complete graph was used.
• The first agent observes what the second agent communicates;
only the first agent updates its opinion following one of the
update rules.
• Time is measured in number of average interactions per agent.
3.2. Wishers with Continuous Observations
(New Model 1)
When we have wishers who make statements in the form of
their continuous choice, we have the case where each agent i
believes there is one true optimal choice, A or B. And, instead
of observing only the favorite choice of agent j, agent j provides
as information its own probability pj that A is the best choice.
Communication, therefore is a continuous value, just as in the BC
models. The difference is that, while any probability value can be
a representation of the agent point of view, there is the underlying
assumption that only p = 0 or p = 1 (and no other value) can be
the correct answers. The simplest model for this case is to assume
a simple likelihood for the value pj agent j communicates, if A
is the best choice (as there are only two choices, we only need to
worry about one). For the bounded continuous variable, a natural
choice is to use a Beta distribution Be(pj|α, β,A) as the likelihood
that agent jwill express pj as his opinionwhenA is the best choice,
where
Be(pj|α, β,A) =
1
B(α, β)
pα−1j (1− pj)
β−1
and where B(α, β) is obtained from Gamma functions by
B(α, β) =
Ŵ(α)Ŵ(β)
Ŵ(α + β)
.
Here, α and β are the usual parameters that define the shape
of the Beta function. Since we assume that agent j has some
information aboutA and that each agent is more likely to be right
than wrong, we need to choose a shape for Be(pj|α, β,A) that
favors larger values of pj (since, in this case, we are assuming that
A is true). That corresponds to α > β . The difference between α
and β dictates how much the opinion of agent j will influence the
opinion of agent i. For symmetry purposes, we will assume that,
if we assume B is the best choice, the likelihood will be given by
Be(pj|β, α,B).
This choice makes the application of Bayes Theorem quite
simple. We have, for the odds-ratio (to avoid the normalization
term),
pi(t + 1)
1− pi(t + 1)
=
piBe(pj|α, β,A)
(1− pi)Be(pj|β, α,B)
=
pi
1− pi
p
α−β
j
(1− pj)α−β
(1)
Applying Bayes Theorem and using the same transformation to
log-odds νi as in the CODA model
νi = ln
(
pi
1− pi
)
,
we obtain the very simple dynamics
νi(t + 1) = νi(t)+ (α − β)νj. (2)
Equation (2) is similar to the CODA dynamics (where we would
have νi(t + 1) = νi(t) + δ, with a fixed δ), except that now, at
each step, instead of adding a term that is constant in size, we
add a term that is proportional to the log-odds νj of the opinion
of the neighbor j. This means that the system should also tend
to the extreme values, in opposition to the BC models where
verbalization was also continuous but the agents were mixers.
Here, as νj increases, so will the change in each step, making the
long term increase in νi no longer linear. Instead, we have an
exponential growth in νi. Simulations were prepared to confirm
the full effect of this change when each agent only interacts with
a fixed neighborhood. Square lattices with periodic boundary
conditions and von Neumann neighborhood were used and the
state of the system observed after different average number of
interactions t per agent. During the initial stages, we observe
a behavior very similar to that of the CODA model, with a
clear appearance of domains for both possible choices. However,
instead of freezing, those domains keep changing and expanding
and, eventually, one of the options emerge as victorious and the
system arrives at a consensus.
Figure 1 shows histograms with the observed distributions
for νi for systems that ran for different amounts of time. The
important thing to notice there is how the scale of typical values
for νi changes with time. In the original CODA model, the
extremist peaks, after the same number of average interactions
per agent (500), corresponded to νi around 430 (that is around
500 steps away from changing opinions, with the size of the
step determined by a = 70%). That value was already quite
extreme since it corresponded to probabilities of around 10–
300. Now, however, instead of peaks of νi around −430, we
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FIGURE 1 | Distribution of the log-odd opinions νi after t interactions
per agent for new model 1, wishers with continuous observations.
can see at Figure 1 we reach νi values in the order of 10
215,
corresponding to the exponential increase in νi predicted by
Equation (2). Unlike CODA, there is no visible peak close to
those much larger values. But one has to notice that, while the
larger box close to 0 is the most frequent one, that does not mean
moderate values are common. Indeed, since a limited number
of boxes has to be used, for larger values of t, the range of the
“moderate” box goes from 0 to very large values of ν. If we
take t = 20 as an example, while the largest but rare values
reach 2 × 108, the standard deviation of the νi is still 3.4 × 10
7.
Even the appearance that the mean might be close to 0 is an
illusion as, in this case, the actual mean value was 2.1 × 106, a
hundredth of the largest value, but still very large. The system
as a whole observes a surprisingly fast appearance of extremists.
After as little as five average interactions per agents, we can
have opinions so extreme that it would have taken 100 CODA
model interactions to obtain. The lack of freezing in the domains
is actually due to these ever increasing opinions. As one side
domain randomly gets a much larger value of νi, this strength
is enough to move the border freely and eventually, one of the
options wins.
As an illustration, Figure 2 shows the spatial configuration
of the choices for the agents as time progresses. The choices
are defined as in CODA, that is, each site is collored black if
νi > 0 and white if it is not. While agents now observe the
probabilities instead of the choices, we still have that values of ν
larger than 0 correspond to probabilities that A is the best choice
larger than 0.5. Therefore, preference is still well defined. We can
see the formation of domains after t = 5, just as it would be
observed in the original CODAmodel. However, while in CODA
those domains would freeze and only have their edges smoothed,
keeping their basic shape after that time, the exponential growth
of νi for wishers cause the walls to move and some of the domains
to grow and dominate the others, until only one remains.
FIGURE 2 | Time evolution of the spatial distribution of preferred
choices (defined by whether vi is larger than 0 or not) for new model 1,
wishers with continuous observations. Here, a black site represents an
agent who prefers A and a white site, an agent who prefers B.
3.3. Mixers with Discrete Observations
(New Model 2)
The last remaining model to study is the opposite case. Now,
each agent only states its best bet on which of A or B should make
a larger part of the optimal answer. Instead of trying to determine
which option is the best, the agent is trying to find the correct
mixture of both choices. That is, we can no longer talk about a
probability pi agent i assigns to A being the optimal choice (and
1 − pi for B). Instead, we need to have a continuous probability
distribution gi(f ) over the values 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 for each agent i and
a rule for the agent to make its choice based on this distribution.
The simplest rule is that the agent communicates its best guess,
based on whether the expected value of f is larger or smaller
than 0.5.
The agent tries to determine the optimal frequency fo.
Assuming that other agents have information on fo, a reasonable
and simple model is that agent i might be trying to learn the
proportion of choices in favor of A and B, assuming that the
chance a neighbor will show choice A to be fo. In this case,
the inference on fo becomes the simple problem of estimating
the chances of success of a Binomial random draw. Once again,
the Be(fj|α, β) distribution is useful, except this time, it is the
natural choice for the prior opinion gi(f ), since it is the conjugate
distribution to the Binomial likelihood. The values of αi and βi
now represent the belief of the agent i; the average estimate is
very easily obtained from αi
αi+βi
. That basically means the agent j
states it thinks a larger proportion of A is preferable if αj > βj,
and a larger proportion of B corresponds to αj < βj.
The update rule one obtains is also trivially simple. If i
observes j has a preference for A, it alters its distribution by
making
αi(t + 1) = αi(t)+ 1 (3)
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and it keeps βi constant. If it observes j chooses B, then αi is
unchanged and we have
βi(t + 1) = βi(t)+ 1 (4)
What is interesting and surprising here is that, while the values
of the internal probability can be quite different, the qualitative
rule for when the opinion of one agent changes from A to B is
exactly the same as in the CODA model. Indeed, the above rule
is equivalent to adding or subtracting one to α − β , depending
on whether A or B is observed. And the opinion changes when
α − β changes sign. That is the same rule of the CODA model.
In CODA, the same dynamics was based on the log-odds ν.
As the actual dynamics of ν in CODA can be renormalized to
increments of size 1, both models will yield, given the same initial
conditions and same random number generator, the exact same
path in terms of configuration of choices on the lattice. Adoption
of either choice will behave exactly the same way in both models.
On the other hand, in the original CODA, probabilities change
much faster. For example, if after 500 interactions, one specific
agent had made 465 observations favoring A and 35 favoring B,
we have seen that the effect of these 430 total steps for A meant
the probability 1 − p of B being the best option goes all the way
down to 10–300. Here, if we start with α ≈ β ≈ 1 (a choice close
to uncertainty), we will have, after the same 500 interactions, an
average proportion for A of 466/502, something close to 93%.
From this point, it would take the same number of influences in
favor of B to change agent i decision toward B as it would have
taken in the original CODA, that is 430 interactions favoring B.
The opinion on which side should be more important is equally
hard to change. But the very strong extremism we had observed
there is gone, replaced by a reasonable estimate that the optimal
proportion should still have some B (7%).
3.4. Communication or Assumptions:
Comparing the Four Models
To compare the four cases easier, I have run a series of
simulations where every agent can interact with all the others.
At each interaction, agent i randomly draws an agent j to
observe.With no local effects, all the systems will eventually reach
consensus and we can focus only on how the strength of the
opinions evolve. In all cases, the initial conditions included half
of the agents showing some form of preference for each case and
consensus emerges as one opinion randomly becomes prevalent.
The magnitude of the difference in the evolution of the average
opinions can be seen in the graphics shown in Figure 3. For the
case where we have wishers and discrete communication, the
strength of opinion increases so fast that it is simply impossible
to show its evolution in the same graphic as the other two cases.
If we get the other two cases in the same graphic in a way
that their evolution can be observed, the wishers with discrete
communication soon move out of range. Therefore, each case
is shown in its own graphic. In order to understand the graphic
better, note that odds of 1:10 translate to values of ν = 2.3; 1:100
corresponds to ν = 4.6; 1:1000 is ν = 6.9, and so on.
We see that the difference between wishers and mixers is
huge. Wishers opinions always become very strong, while the
FIGURE 3 | Evolution of the average value of strength of the opinion,
measured by ν = ln
(
p
1−p
)
as a function of time. Time is measured in
average interactions per agent and each point corresponds to the average
value of 20 realizations of the problem. Due to the extreme difference in values,
the evolution could not be visually shown in the same graphic. The upper left
graphic corresponds to temporal evolution of a population of wishers with
discrete communication, that is, the regular CODA model; the upper right, we
have mixers with with discrete communication (new model 2); while both
graphics in the lower line show the case of wishers with continuous
communication (new model 1), at left, just its evolution to 1/10 of the time the
previous cases evolved. At lower right, the evolution of opinions for the new
model 1 (wishers and continuous communication) is shown for the whole
range of times with a logarithmic scale of the opinions.
same is not true for mixers. This suggests that our mental
models are probably a crucial key to prevent extremism.
Interestingly, for mixers, when they observe choices and not the
internal probability, that still allows them to get opinions that
become stronger with time. When they observe the continuous
evaluations, we have the results of the Bounded Confidence
models, even if we do a Bayesian version [90]. And, in this case,
if no trust considerations are introduced, as it is the case of
the other results here, the average opinion ν will always stay
around zero (p = 0.5) for an initially random population, the
exact opposite of extremism. Even more, each agent will move
toward this value, becoming more moderate in time. That is,
observing the amount of existing uncertainty allows mixers to
estimate the actual initial proportion of support for each idea in
the population. When they only state their preferences, random
effects, even if small, do make one of those preferences obtain
a little more support. As a consequence, the perceived optimal
mixture shifts to favoring that one random choice. But we never
get to real extreme values.
The exact opposite effect is observed for wishers. Just
observing the choice of their neighbors makes wishers opinions
already strong enough to be described as very extreme. While we
might have expected that observing the uncertainty or doubt on
the part of the other agents would lead them to some amount of
doubt and, therefore, less extremism, that was not the case at all.
The effect we observed for wishers can be described better in two
steps. Observing doubt just once could mean a smaller change in
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the probability the agent assigns to the best option (this can be
easily adjusted by the model parameters). But in the long run,
the opinions get stronger as constant reinforcement happens.
Even if we start the system with smaller increases, as the agents
observe their peers becomingmore confident, their opinions start
changing faster. It makes sense, as people with stronger opinions
are expected to have a stronger influence. That is where the
problem starts because there is no limit on the strength of these
influences. At some point, the change in opinions will become as
strong as it would have been if only the choice had been observed.
From there, opinions will still keep increasing, making those
changes larger and larger with each interaction. This influence
actually grows exponentially and, given time, we can observe the
absurd increase in certainty we see in Figure 3.
The message is clear. In these models, mixers opinions seem
to never grow as strongly as the those of wishers. Indeed, either
they will not grow at all, as in Bounded Confidence models, or
they will approach certainty slowly (a mixture with frequencies of
f = 1 or 0) due to random effects causing one option to receive
a greater amount of support. But even then, we only observe
ν growing logarithmically. On the other hand, wishers always
observe a strong growth of the probability as shown by the linear
or exponential growth of ν, depending on how communication
happens. Surprisingly, uncertainty in that communication can
even make their opinions much stronger in the long run. And all
of these results were obtained withmodels that do not include the
fact that, as a person opinion becomes stronger, she will probably
start disregarding opinions that disagree with her own.
Those results bring some remarkable evidence on how to deal
with extreme opinions. They suggest that changing the way we
communicate might not prevent extreme views at all. If we do
not consider long term effects, it might even make things worse
in the long run. We should notice that, in the cases studied
here, the strengthening of the opinions happened only by social
influence, no observations of the world were ever made. That
means that there was no real reason for the system as a whole
to go to such extremes as there was no real data confirming either
possibility. The problem with unwarranted extreme opinions
seems to be deeply connected with the way we think. It seems
to be a consequence of our wish to find one truth, of our desire to
believe and take the side of one option.
The message this exercise in Opinion Dynamics adds to
the conclusions of this paper is clear. Not only our self-
defining beliefs hinder our ability to think correctly and consider
all evidence as well as not being supported by any kind of
rational norm. This tendency to pick sides also seems to
make our opinions absurdly stronger than they should be.
And this tendency seems to be at the very heart of why
extremism arises. The agents in these simulations were willing to
change their opinions given enough influence. Even under these
idealized conditions, the simple desire to have one option as the
best answer already caused severe problems, making opinions
absurdly and unwarrantedly strong. This reinforces the evidence
we had, from cognitive psychology as well as both deductive
and inductive logic, that we should not take sides. Indeed, the
conclusion just became a little stronger: we should not even want
to take sides. In the next Section, we leave the study of extremism
behind and I will inspect the consequences of our tendency to
belief by discussing effects this bias causes on the ways we make
Science.
4. SCIENTIFIC CHOICES, BELIEFS, AND
PROBLEMS
4.1. Creating and Evaluating Theories
The naïve description of the scientific enterprise says it is the
job of Science to find the one truth about the world. Sometimes,
scientists actually believe they have done just that. But this is the
type of belief that would make them unreliable sources about
the ideas they defend. Even when they recognize that we still
are far from knowing it all, that our current ideas might be the
best ones we have but are only tentative descriptions, scientists
often expect that 1 day we will create that one winning theory, the
Grand Unification that will explain everything. That might come
to pass, of course. But given all we have seen so far, we should
question how much of our human failures might be influencing
the reliability of the Science we do today. And, if there are
problems, what we can do to mitigate them.
The desire to have one winning theory, the one idea that will
rule them all, as we have seen, ought to have consequences. When
using inductive methods, it might actually be the case that a
mixture of the available theories does a much better job than each
one individual idea can do by itself. And, in every case, ideas are
to be ranked by how probable they are, not discarded nor proved
right.We have just seen in Section 3 that whenwe look for the one
correct idea, our estimates can become much stronger than they
should be. In some rare cases, when there is strong evidence that
no idea does a perfect work, we actually have seen the survival
and acceptance of a mixture of even incompatible theories.
Such is the case of Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity,
as each of them describes a different set of observations with
what is considered remarkable accuracy and fail at explaining
the phenomena the other theory describes. But this reasonably
peaceful cohabitation of the minds of the researchers seems to be
a rare case, caused by the utter failure of each theory to provide
decent predictions for the set of experiments where the other
one meets its greatest successes. It would be good to look at this
example and think that the scientists are working as they should,
but they actually never had a choice. Physicists still look for the
one theory that will unify them both, as they should do. But the
amazing success of physical theories is both a very lucky case that
allows physicists to ignore most considerations about mixture
of ideas and probabilistic induction and also a curse that has
prevented them from learning those lessons.
We have always had idealized prescriptions about how the
nature and demands of the scientific work and how scientists
should behave. Standards are extremely important, of course.
Given the enormous success of the scientific enterprise, it used
to make sense to assume that individual scientists did not deviate
much from the norms of the area. Some of them certainly did,
but errors and deceptions ought to be the exception. However,
since the first observations of how scientists actually work with
their ideas, it has become very clear that we do not follow
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the norms we believed we obeyed. That happens even among
people working in some of our greatest technical feats, such as
the Apollo missions [96]. The departure of the idealized norm
seemed to be so prevalent that the personnel in those missions
considered normal that, under the right circumstances, people
they respected intellectually could hold dogmatic positions and
not be convinced of their erroneous views even by data.
Feyerabend [97] observed, from historical cases as well as
his own interactions with scientists, that our typical behavior
did not match the ideas he had been told were the right way
to do Science. His observations were quite influential and have
even led people to think the whole reliability of the scientific
enterprise could be seriously compromised. A shortened version
of the rules he assumed we obeyed are the tentative norms that
scientists should not use ad-hoc hypotheses, nor try ideas that
contradict reliable experimental results, nor use hypotheses that
diminished the content of other empirically adequate hypotheses,
neither propose inconsistent hypothesis. And yet, he found
evidence that all these norms were broken on a daily basis.
More importantly, this breaking had been instrumental in many
important advances. If those rules were indeed the source of
Science credibility, it looked as if there was no reason to
place more trust in scientific knowledge than in any other
form of knowledge. Luckily that is not the case. One of his
main conclusions, that all ideas are worth pursuing, is actually
a prescription of a number of inductive methods. Instead of
limiting the ideas that should be tested, inductive methods
actually support the exact concept that every idea must be kept,
tested as a possibility, and ranked. Of course, the fact that we are
limited beings plays an important role. We can not know every
possible idea and demonstration. For us, the need to test all ideas
actually means that we must work to get more and more ideas
created. Most of them will be utter failures, with probabilities so
close to zero that they will be indeed useless. But we only know
that after we come upwith them and verify howwell they describe
the world.
If we want real probabilities and not only odd ratios between
two ideas, Bayesian methods actually require, for the ideal
situation, that we should consider all possible explanations
[98]. Similarly, Solomonoff method for induction [66] requires
a theoretical computer that would be able to generate every
possible program, up to infinite length, and average over all
programs that produce as output the data we already know.
While both approaches are obviously impossible, they provide
the ideal situation. As we work to get closer to the ideal, we
have to realize that we must indeed catalog all possible ideas,
including those very same hypothesis Feyerabend had thought
to be forbidden. Obviously, hypotheses that contain logical
inconsistencies are not acceptable per se. But even those can
be useful as a middle step, if they inspire us to later obtain a
consistent set of hypotheses, by correcting initial problems and
inconsistencies. On the other hand, this prescription does not
lead to any kind of relativism, contrary to what Feyerabend’s
followers would like to believe. We just need them all to verify
which ideas actually match our observations better.
So, how close can we can get to proving a theory “wrong”?
The answer can be illustrated by the classical observation of
the advance of Mercury’s perihelion and why this experiment
was seen as a “proof” that Newtonian Mechanics had to be
replaced by General Relativity. Here, we are talking about two
theories that agree incredibly well with experiments. But they
still disagree in some predictions and, as those cases started
to be tested, there was no longer any doubts in the minds
of the physicists about which theory was superior. The subtle
differences in where Mercury was when it got closer to the Sun
and how that varied over centuries was one of the first very
strong “proofs.” When the two theories started competing, it was
known that when we estimate every influence of the other planets
on Mercury’s orbit using Newtonian Mechanics, its perihelion
should move 5557.18 ± 0.85 s of arc per century. However,
the actual observed displacement was 5599.74 ± 0.41 [99]. On
the other hand, General Relativity introduced a correction of
43.03 to the Newtonian prediction, bringing the actual estimate
of the difference between observed measurement and prediction
from 42.56 ± 0.94 to 0.47 ± 0.94 (the errors have been
estimated by me simply adding the variances in Clemence article
and are, therefore, not much more than an educated guess).
We have the Newtonian prediction at a distance of 45.28 times
the standard deviation from the observation and the General
Relativity at a distance of 0.4997 standard deviations. Therefore,
if we assume the observed variations have a Normal distribution,
the likelihood ratio between the two theories would be
L =
e−
−0.49972
2
e−
−45.282
2
=
0.8826
7.19× 10−446
= 1.2× 10445. (5)
In other words, if you started by believing General Relativity
had just one in a billion chance to be a better description (1 in
109), you would end concluding it was actually better by a chance
around 1 in 10445−9 = 10436.
It is very important to notice that this calculation is heavily
dependent on the assumption that the errors would follow a
Normal distribution, which is a rather thin-tailed distribution.
If we do change the distribution of the experimental errors
to a distribution with much larger tails, as for example, an
arbitrary t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom, things change
dramatically. In this case, the likelihood ratio would be now
L =
(
1+ 0.4997
2
10
)−11/2
(
1+ 45.28
2
10
)−11/2 = 0.8731.87× 10−13 = 4.65× 1012. (6)
Now, an initial opinion of one in a billion against General
Relativity would be transformed in something around 1 in
1000 in favor of it. However, the change in opinion is still
quite impressive. And this was just one single experiment. Since
then, many other experiments have confirmed the predictions
of General Relativity. It is not difficult to see that today the
probability of Newtonian Mechanics being correct is basically
zero for all practical purposes. Results in Physics have been
so discriminating between competing theories in most cases
that physicists can work perfectly well if they behave as if the
experiments were proofs.
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The different likelihood ratios shows that the results can
indeed depend heavily on the assumptions we make, even when
the evidence is very clear. Those assumptions can complicate any
probability estimates; dealing with this is beyond our objectives
in this article. Some hypotheses about the errors will be more
probable, others less so. We just need to observe that a theory
can really become extremely unlikely given data. Technically,
that does not mean Newtonian Mechanics probability is now a
mathematical zero. But we can say that it is zero; saying it is not
is a waste of effort, unless you are making a mathematical point.
And yet, this exercise was not the complete problem, it was only
a comparison between two theories. And we should include all
possible alternatives, including unorthodox versions of the two
theories we tested. The vastmajority of other alternatives describe
the data so much worse than the “wrong” Newtonian Mechanics
that we do not even bother to enumerate them. Physicists have
been quite lucky in the way data can discriminate between
competing ideas. When that happens, concerns about our limited
reasoning power are far more relevant than the prescription that
all ideas should be kept.
On the other hand, Feyerabend correct conclusion that
we must keep generating new ideas has some interesting
consequences that people seldom consider. One of them is the
actual strong usefulness of the existence of purely theoretical
scientists. They are already a major part of the culture in the
physical sciences and they also exist in some areas of Biology,
such as Evolution. Having people dedicated solely to coming
up with new better ideas means we can generate those needed
ideas faster, meaning those fields are bound to benefit from
their specialized knowledge. There are also incidental and very
strong benefits from having a large number of people who do
not make experiments or generate any data. And that is the
simple fact that the people who will check their ideas are not
the same as the proponents of the theories, allowing for a much
less personally-biased analysis. The current tendency to demand
that people produce the ideas and the data that supports those
ideas is bound to result into biased choices of sets of data. And
coupled with statistical techniques created to choose instead of
ranking ideas, we already have whole areas where there is good
reason to consider the conclusions of published papers to be
unreliable. Someone proposing the idea and providing the tests
for it is actually a very strong moral hazard and we should build
our areas in a way that makes this hazard less probable. Having
pure theorists is not only a good idea about dividing the work
and generating needed new ideas faster. It is also a good idea
because it avoids ethical problems in data analysis, as well as our
tendency to defend our own ideas. Of course, theorists require
that we know enough about a specific problem that we can start
generating several theories and this might not be the case yet for
some areas of knowledge.
There is another cognitive advantage of having theorists. A
recent study on judicial rulings has shown that legal training
and experience seems to provide some resistance to identity-
protective cognition. Unfortunately, that resistance only applied
to the situations about legal reasoning for which the judges had
been trained [100]. This suggests that it is possible to train people
to make decisions that are closer to neutrality, at least on matters
that are clear, logical applications of already known ideas. A
central aspect of this training effect might come as a consequence
that legal training is indeed based on a series of well defined
rules. People learn to apply those rules, avoiding normal biases.
This seems no different from the fact that, while we naturally
fail miserably at simple logical problems, we are very good at
solving them when they happen in an everyday situation and we
can train ourselves to become good in normal logical problems.
There are also several experiments that show that professionals
actually fail at their own tasks and at evaluating their own rate of
success when they do not have access to fact-correcting strategies.
Simple training alone is not enough. We need training, we need
to learn when we are making mistakes and, whenever possible,
we need to making thinking tools to correct our human nature.
Mathematics and logic play exactly that role, a similar role to the
legal training that judges receive and allow them to overcome
their biases. A mathematical or logical demonstration is not
subject to our biases, anyone with the proper training will find
mistakes that are not too subtle or hard. It is not mathematics that
is unreasonably effective [101], it is the standard for comparison,
our own reasoning, that is far poorer than we would like to admit.
The importance of having logically sound reasoning in every
field of knowledge makes the existence of classes of scientists
specialized in applying mathematical tools to the exploration of
each area another strong defense against human failings.
The need for the creation and acceptance of new ideas as part
of the theoretical repertoire of an area has at least another very
important consequence. While individuals might have difficulty
accepting ideas that contradict their favorite theories, we must
make it sure that this difficulty must not happen in any area
as a whole. Cultural norms can help offset the bad behavior of
the scientists [102]. In every field, new ideas should be always
welcome or, at the very least, not forbidden, even though most
of them might prove to be very improbable. Unfortunately,
the needed openness to new theories might not be a common
characteristic. Heavy reliance on the use of authority figures,
a need to show that someone has said something similar
before, these all too common practices could lead whole areas
to stop advancing. If agreement with what has already been
said is expected, advance might come to a halt. The refuse
of many physicists to accept String Theory as a theoretical
construct on the basis that it does not provide new predictions
is epistemologically absurd, even more when we consider that its
predictions actually work. The problem many people see with
String Theory is that it just provides, for the experiments we
can do, the same predictions of the older models. This goes
directly against the belief physicists have that there will be only
one true theory. And, as humans, they feel the urge to defend
that random belief. Ironically, from an inductive point of view,
the truth is that having more than one theory providing the same
predictions is actually epistemologically useful. This is easier to
see using Solomonoff framework. Identical predictions generated
by different programs make those predictions more probable
[66]! Finally, it is worth noticing that we already have some
simulation evidence that, if social influence becomes too strong,
an area might fail to replace an old theory for a better one
[103, 104]. The habit of constantly referring and excessive citing
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of old works is, indeed, something that should be considered
worrisome. We need to allow new theories to be created and
compared to reality. It does not matter if their predictions are
not new or if we might not like them or if they may sound
too weird at start nor if they go against what is the consensus.
Competence is always mandatory, of course, but that is the only
requirement of the scientific game. A good part of what makes an
area trustworthy might be just its ability to allow the appearance
of the new, the creation of ever new competitors for the position
of the best description we currently have.
4.2. Tests and the Desire to Know
Of course, not only openness to new ideas matter. Simple
competence is of fundamental importance, and one aspect of
being competent is our competence in data analysis. But the
history of the use of statistical methods in areas as Medicine and
Psychology is one where competence was traded for ease of use
allied to a desire to find the one true answer. It is not unreasonable
to conclude that many statistical tools have been developed as
statisticians were prey to our human tendencies; rejecting ideas
is a recurrent theme in the development of the area. And that
had to lead to a new set of problems. Things have become so
out of control that there is now good reason to consider most
results of those areas as unreliable [105, 106]. The causes are
not only statistical methods but also the lack of deeper statistical
knowledge, of course, coupled to absolutely damaging politics
from the journals about when to accept an experimental paper.
Still, it is clear that the use of methods that reject ideas is at the
very heart of the observed problems. When using knowledge,
full decision procedures are needed and that will often mean, in
practical terms, to behave as if one of the possibilities were the
true one. But this is true only for the decisions, such as which
treatment to prescribe.
In particular, data analysis that wants to avoid generating
biases in the scientists and readers minds should not include
statements that could sound as if we were pointing at one idea
as the correct one nor at one idea as the wrong one. We should
avoid any kind of hypothesis testing. Ideally we should just point
to which ideas are or seem more probable or, when that is not
feasible just present and provide useful summaries of the data. An
article that estimates rough probabilities is not a problem, if it is
clear the estimates are rough. The same is valid for an article that
only shows the characteristics of the data. Strong statements with
no estimate of uncertainty are problematic. This prescription is
something different researchers have been obtaining as they study
the many errors associated with bad statistical usage and how
it interacts with publishing practices. The absurdly disastrous
practice of some areas where most journals would only publish
results with “strong” p−values has led to nefarious consequences
due to severe publication bias [105].
Recently, we have already observed many scientists also
pointing the serious problems that arise from making tests,
regardless of whether the journals would publish all experiments
or just a severely biased collection of them [107]. In Medicine,
cautionary articles about this misuse of statistical methods exist
for more than two decades [108]. The widespread use of p-
values as a way to avoid thinking about the statistical problem
has already been correctly labeled as surrogate science [109]
and warnings about how p-values can be useless exist [110].
Correcting techniques have been proposed to allow us to use the
existing reported p-values in the already existing literature in a
non-testing manner [111] but, unfortunately, while they make
sense from a statistical point of view, they can not compensate
for the fact that the reported values we have in print are useless,
as they were also the consequence of the publication biases. The
need to completely abandon null-hypothesis significance testing
has been acknowledged [112] but the suggestion to simply change
it for confidence (or credibility) intervals is not necessarily an
improvement from the point of view of the reader. Some readers
might still read it as strong support to one idea [113]. On the
other hand, acknowledgment of the dangers of null-hypothesis
significance testing have finally reached the point where the
method has simply been banned from at least one journal [114],
so things are improving, albeit slowly. Misuse of statistics in the
literature is not limited to problems with tests and p-values and
represent a much larger problem with competence in general
[115], but the area is already concluding that tests should not
be used. This should be no surprise as tests are too similar to
taking sides. Our desire for final answers is why hypothesis tests
were created, despite the ever obvious fact that the tests never
tell which hypothesis is true. But the terminology seemed to
imply they did, with terms such as rejection or non-rejection.
Estimating the actual probabilities might be too difficult for
many problems. How to do it is often an open problem for
researchers in statistics, but the fact remains that choosing sides
about hypothesis is not warranted. Epistemologically, no idea
should ever be rejected.
5. DISCUSSION
Changing from normal, committed beliefs to probabilistic,
uncertain beliefs might not be easily done. Our societies and
our institutions are currently built around the concept that ideas
should be defended. We teach our kids to stand for what they
believe, we teach them that debating means defending instead of
analyzing ideas. But the fact that we have always done that does
not mean this is the best way to do things. What we have seen
here strongly supports the idea that we should start learning as
soon as possible that ideas are to be challenged, not supported.
They can be often safely discarded, as probabilities fly to zero. But
openness to change is paramount. This is a concept that scientists
have always claimed to follow. It might be useful to distinguish
in our language the two types of beliefs, supporting unwarranted
beliefs from probabilistic ones, to make it clear that they are
not the same. Probabilistic beliefs (peliefs?) are correct while
committed beliefs make us stupid. By claiming a probability we
are not committing ourselves to an idea, at least not so strongly.
It should be easier later to accept those ideas were wrong. Socrates
sounds like he had grasped it, when he used to claim he had
no knowledge about the world, but we have kept making this
same mistake throughout the millennia since then. We should
not teach anyone to debate and support an idea, we should teach
people to look for mistakes in all the sides of the discussion. We
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should not think that one political side will have the right ideas
and should be supported against the wrong side. It is perfectly
possible and sometimes very likely that one of the sides will be
correct more often than the other side. But chances are that good
and bad ideas will come from everywhere. My beliefs are my
fallible opinion, at best they are only likely to be the current best
option.
There will be cases when taking sides will be unavoidable.
Moral issues might be an important exception to the rule of
never taking sides. We do not know there is a right moral
answer and, while the vast majority of us will agree on many
basic ideas, it is not clear that there are right answers. Defending
your own moral values might not be a problem, assuming you
do know them perfectly well and that they do not suffer from
logical inconsistencies. Unfortunately, there will also be times
when taking sides about descriptions of the real world will
be the best decision, given the circumstances. When people
argue against vaccines, or that evolution is only a theory (the
example on General Relativity should make it abundantly clear
that some theories can become even more probable than any
single experimental result), or any number of “crazy” ideas we
see everyday, we often have too much data showing that they are
wrong. Under some circumstances, we are actually in a situation
where one of the probabilities has gone to basically zero. And
then, accepting the death of little children or the spread of
damaging world views, just for the sake of a trivial reminder
that 10−100 is technically (and only technically) not zero, would
make no sense at all. When public discussion is a realm of
incompetence case, simply stating the competent view will mean
taking sides.
The need to change the way we debate should be clear by now.
Taking sides can make us stupid. The more intelligent we are, the
better equipped we are to defend our ideas and, paradoxically,
the more stupid our beliefs can make us. Worse yet, the way
we believe not only make it harder to get to the best answer.
There is very good reason to think that the concept that there
must be a correct answer is at the very core of the raise of
extremist positions. Belief and belonging are very probably the
main motors behind ideological violence. By changing what we
consider to be acceptable ways of discourse, we might contribute
to faster advances and technologies and also to a safer world.
I believe or, more exactly, I strongly “pelieve” that, if we start
paying attention to when we and others have group defining
beliefs and if we start denouncing that behavior in ourselves and
in others, there is a strong chance we will diminish the problems
I have identified here.
The conclusion that we must not take sides also has
consequences on how we researchers interact with our own
scientific practice. We have been making mistakes in all fields of
knowledge. While those mistakes have luckily been completely
inconsequential in areas as Physics, they have been very costly
in other fields of knowledge. It is not an exaggeration to
claim our desire to take sides has cost many lives, since we
have serious problems on the published results in Medicine.
In the Humanities, the constant struggle between ideologies
has certainly posed obstacles to our knowledge. It is close to
impossible to figure out who might be right at many issues.
Taking sides and defending ideas has rendered the opinion of
researchers completely useless in the cases we do not have clear
data. Incompetence can always be detected, of course. But when
arguments become more solid and sophisticated, the fact that
there is no logical and mathematical foundations we can use to
check them in a way that is independent of our severely biased
human argumentation means that it might not be possible to
even guess who is right. Work that simply describes situations
is probably less prone to the problem.
We must also remember how the desire to obtain the one true
answer has led the opinions of the agents to absurd extremes.
The simulations are clearly not a representation of the whole
process of human thinking. But the strength of the results does
suggest that the difference between wishers, who want to find
the one true idea, and mixers, who accept that they might need
to live with a mixture of ideas coming from different theories,
might be a fundamental problem. Checking the robustness of
these results under different model assumptions is still needed.
But the behavior we have observed in the models in this paper
already poses significant evidence that this distinction is probably
a very important one. That means that it is not only taking
sides we should avoid. We must not even want to take sides.
Add the psychological already observed effects to the quite
probable problems arising from social interactions suggested
by the simulations, we must learn that we should never use
techniques to choose between ideas. Our statistical techniques
must be developed and chosen to deal with the problem that arise
from the fact that we are humans and quite fallible.
It is also interesting to notice that some of the ideas that
gave birth to the most damaging forms of relativism are correct.
They do not have the consequences people thought they have.
But we do need to allow for the development of every type of
theory and ideas. The crucial difference is that this actual need
does not mean that all ideas are equal, some are more probable,
others, as unlikely they can be safely dismissed. The fact that
we need to test as many theories as possible means we should
indeed have theoretical scientists in every field of knowledge. If
the people who propose the ideas are not the same who obtain the
data, observations and conclusions become far more trustworthy.
Science must come to terms with our human shortcomings, with
our desire to defend our own ideas and groups.
Before moving to the closing, some comments on the
consistency of these conclusions is warranted. The conclusion
that we should not hold beliefs is, of course, a belief and thismight
seem contradictory at first. It is actually not a contradiction, since
we can have conclusions that are very likely to be true, instead of
actually knowing them to be true. To evaluate its probability, we
need to check the basis for the paper conclusion. It has two basis.
One is the fact there is no real logical grounds for beliefs. This is
pure logical reasoning; logic could change in time but guessing
about future developments is simply beyond our abilities. The
other source of doubt is the experimental results that show that
we damage our reasoning when we pick sides. This conclusion
seems quite robust and likely but, as with any experimental
results, those results could be caused by sheer luck, which is very
unlikely, or some effect we simply do not know about. Finally,
the conclusion here is not self-defeating. While I, as the author,
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am defending an idea, you, the reader, should really not trust
me. But you can follow the reasoning and the logical proofs in
the literature. And you can check the psychological data and
arrive at the same conclusions yourself, without having to trust
me.
We used to think we lived at the center of the Universe. We
used to think we were not related to the animals. We used to
think that we were governed by our reason and that our emotions
did not have a significant impact on us. It is now time to realize
that our reasoning is also deeply flawed. It does not work the
way we always thought it did and we can not always trust our
own arguments. We can only learn to use tools to correct for the
severe problems in our very fallible reasoning. Those tools have
brought us this far and they are what make Science deserve some
trust, while other alternatives deserve none. Without those tools,
it seems that, every time we try to reason, we may lie to others
and we may lie to ourselves. We are that incompetent when we
do not correct our biases. For now, I leave the reader with the
commandment of the title: “Thou shalt not take sides.”
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